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Issues of persistence through time have been controversial in recent scholarship. A 
popular new view is four-dimensionalism: the view that time is a dimension much like 
space. Although it has been motivated in part by advancements in special relativity, 
four-dimensionalism has primarily emerged as a solution to recent metaphysical 
dilemmas. In this paper, I will examine three solutions to David Lewis’ problem of 
temporary intrinsics. I then find that the four-dimensionalist view of perdurantism 
solves the problem of temporary intrinsics while managing to avoid the serious 
problems that the other two views encounter. I agree with Lewis that it is the best view 
of the three. I will then show that this view in light of problems related to composition, 
nominalist perdurantism best explains our experience of objects. 
 
In his book On the Plurality of Worlds1, David Lewis presents the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. Objects have intrinsic properties that change over time. Intrinsic 
properties are all properties that are not relations to other objects, but matters of the 
object itself. For example, let’s take an a straight stick; it’s straightness is an intrinsic 
property. The stick does not have the property of straightness because it is related to 
another object in a certain way, rather it is straight simply in and of itself. But, just 
because the stick has an intrinsic property does not mean that it must always have this 
property. Intrinsic properties can be temporary. Suppose I bend the stick. It now has the 
intrinsic property of being bent. This means that as a whole through time, we have 
ascribed the stick as with the intrinsic properties of straightness and bentness. But 
straightness and bentness are incompatible; this doesn’t make any sense! Because 
intrinsic properties are temporary, objects that undergo change can have incompatible 
intrinsic properties.  Lewis argues that accepting a perdurantist view of objecthood best 
solves this perplexing problem. 
 
But, others have offered other solutions to Lewis’ problem. The first solution is to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics is endurantism. In his paper Four-Dimensional  
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Objects2, Peter van Inwagen defends a version of endurantism, the view that while time 
is like space, objects endure through it; that is objects wholly exist at any instant. 
Endurantists like Van Inwagen accept a four-dimensional view of time, but deny the 
existence temporal parts.3
 
 The biggest advantages of endurantism are that it avoids the 
problems of three-dimensional theories of time, but have intuitive appeal. The 
endurantist will say that given our strong belief that we are wholly present wherever 
and whenever we are and a lack of empirical evidence in favor of perdurantist theories, 
we have no good reason to accept theories that involve temporal parts. 
It may appear prima facie that endurantists cannot solve the problem of temporary 
intrinsics. Given that objects change and that they are wholly present through time, they 
will have incompatible temporary intrinsic properties. If our bent stick was always fully 
the same stick through time, then it must be both straight and bent. Or does it? 
 
Van Inwagen says it does not. He says that properties are ‘time-indexed.’ When we say 
that someone was hungry at time t1 we mean, “that this object bore the relation having 
to the time-indexed property hunger-at-t1 or else that it bore the time-indexed relation 
having-at-t1 to hunger.”4 Let’s try to rephrase this with less jargon; Van Inwagen wants 
to say that when we are talking about a property of an object at a particular time, we are 
talking about an “instantaneous slice”5
 
 of an object. But, unlike a temporal part of an 
object, the whole object is present. We have taken a slice of the temporal dimension of 
the object, but it remains fully itself. This slice has certain properties, and those 
properties are related to the time in which the slice existed. If we took a second time 
slice of the same object it would have a different set of properties because the second 
slice is related to a different time than the first. However, the object is fully present a 
both time slices.   
In response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, the endurantist will say that the time 
slice of the stick before time t1, the moment it was bent, had the property of straightness 
and that property is related to the time in which it existed. After t1, the stick had a new 
time-indexed property, bentness. The problem of temporary intrinsics doesn’t arise 
because each property is related to a different time-slice of the stick. The stick was fully 
present at all times, but its properties were not. 
 
The second view one could hold to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics is to deny 
the existence of any times except the present. Holding this view, aptly called 
presentism, entails denying a concrete past and the future. The present is the only true 
time, and the past and future are abstract, false times. The presentist avoids the problem 
of temporary intrinsics because she denies any intrinsic properties except the ones that 
exist in the present. With regard to the case of the bent stick, she will say that the only 
intrinsic property of the stick is its bentness. It is bent in the present, and since the past 
is a false time any other intrinsic properties we believe the stick to have had are not 
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false and irrelevant. The stick is not both bent and straight; it's simply bent. The 
presentist has successfully avoided Lewis’ problem.  
 
The final solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics is Lewis’ favorite: to accept 
that incompatible intrinsic properties do not belong to the same thing. Rather, they 
belong to distinct temporal parts. The straight stick and the bent stick are each discrete 
temporal parts of the same stick. The straight stick has the intrinsic property of 
straightness, and the bent stick has the intrinsic property of bentness. It is perfectly 
reasonable for different objects to have incompatible intrinsic properties, so it follows 
that it is perfectly reasonable that the two distinct stages of the stick have two different 
intrinsic properties. This solution, perdurantism, Lewis argues is the best of the three. 
 
But why does Lewis favor the last, perdurantist solution? All three theories solve the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, and all three have their drawbacks. Abductively 
speaking, the best solution will be the least problematic.  
 
The disadvantage to the endurantist solution is that it denies intrinsic properties and 
replacing them with relations. By definition, intrinsic properties are not relations. They 
are those properties that pertain to the object itself, not to the objects relations with 
other things. There are no intrinsic properties anymore, only relations that seem 
intrinsic.  
 
The presentist solution is problematic because it denies genuine change and persistence. 
If the present is the only real time, then things can’t persist because there is no time to 
persist through. And further, an object can’t change because we cannot compare the 
object to any other time. Such a comparison would be to compare a real object (the one 
in the present) to an abstract or false one (the one in the past), and that would be 
fallacious.   
 
The temporal parts solution is unfavorable because adding temporal parts to our 
ontology offends our common sense notion that objects are wholly present whenever 
they exist. Non-perdurantists often object that perdurantism is incoherent or 
nonsensical. Some claim that the idea of temporal parts is so counterintuitive, it is 
practically unintelligible. 
 
Lewis finds that the problems with endurantism and presentism are formidable. 
Intrinsic properties and genuine change and persistence are important philosophical 
distinctions, and giving them up would have severe repercussions. The problems with 
perdurantism, however, aren’t so severe. The perdurantist just has to give up a common 
sense intuition which perhaps she had no good reason to believe anyway. Since the 
temporal parts solution solves the problem of temporary intrinsics and manages to 
avoid serious problems, I agree with Lewis that it is the best view of the three. 
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Now that perdurantism appears to be the least problematic, and the best abductively 
speaking, of theories that avoid Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics. But aside from 
temporal parts, what commitments must perdurantists make? Let’s look at two well-
known theories to get a sense for the details. 
 
In his essay, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, Quine takes up the problem of 
identity. Our most common sense intuitions compel us to suggest that identity is 
entailed in material substance. If I were to ask you why the paper you are holding is the 
same object now as it was before these words were printed on it, I am sure your first 
answer would be that it is made out of the same ‘stuff,’ the same paper fiber or even the 
same protons, neutrons, and electrons now as it was before it became this essay. 
Suppose you take a closer look. In fact, during the printing process there were countless 
ink particles bonded to the paper that were not there before the printing. Strictly 
speaking, the structure of protons, neutrons, and electrons has been altered. The ‘stuff’ 
is not the same. This may be true, but it is undeniable that we really want to say that the 
paper remains the same object.  
 
This is a restated version of Heraclitus’ famous problem of the river; he said “You 
cannot bathe in the same river twice, for new waters are ever flowing in upon you.”6
 
 In 
contemplating the river, Heraclitus encountered the same problem of identity as when 
we considered the paper: if material substance is constantly in flux, then how can 
objects continue?  
Strictly speaking they do not, according to Quine. Heraclitus is correct, each time he 
steps into the river he is bathing in a different river than he did before. The river is 
made up of many “river-stages,” none of which are identical. Rather, they are all 
related; they each are a part of the same river. Or more precisely, they are part of an 
object that we call a river.  
 
Quine’s view is related to what is now called “space-time worm” theory. Like the name 
suggests, it holds that an object is a kind of space-time worm that connects all it’s 
temporal parts together. In the Quine example, the name river is a worm that connects 
various temporal parts together into what we call an object. 
 
This is not the only way to formulate temporal parts. Theodore Sider has offered the 
“stage view” of temporal parts. Like Quine’s view, objects are a series of temporal 
parts. But unlike Quine’s space-time worm theory,  when we refer to an object were are 
actually referring to the instantaneous temporal part at the very moment of utterance,  
not a summation of parts through time.         
 
If perdurantists are willing to add temporal parts to their ontology, then in so far as they 
compose objects, it follows that temporal parts must also become part of their 
mereology. In order to make sense of how temporal parts and objects are related, 
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perdurantists must be able to explain when discrete temporal parts compose an object, 
and when they don’t. 
 
There are three mereological views for the perdurantist to choose from: restricted 
composition, eliminativism, and universalism. Restricted composition the view most 
compatible with common sense intuition. It is the view that not every class has a fusion, 
or simply sometimes two things compose and object, sometimes they don’t. While this 
seems intuitive, creating a principled system for when a class fuses and when it doesn’t 
has been utterly problematic, to a degree that the project is practically impossible. 
 
If restricted composition is the most intuitive of the three theories, then eliminativism is 
certainly the least. It states that no class creates a fusion. There are no objects. The only 
things that exist are “simples,” or the smallest possible things. They are indivisible, 
because anything smaller would not exist. What we believe to be objects are sets of 
simples arranged a certain way. There are no pens, for example, only sets of simples 
arranged pen wise.  
 
The last view is unrestricted composition. It is the theory that every class creates a 
fusion. Any two things combined create an object. It is the intuitive opposite of 
eliminativism; if eliminativism was unintuitive because it gives us far too few objects, 
unrestricted composition is unintuitive because it gives us far too many! According to 
unrestricted composition, my right shoe and your left index finger are an object, as are a 
sock and Stonehenge etc.  
 
Perhaps now we can see the extra burden on perdurantists; they have accepted temporal 
parts into their ontology, but they are now responsible for explaining how these 
temporal parts are composed, and then how temporal parts themselves compose objects. 
Given that restricted composition has been for the most part rejected as a tenable 
philosophical view, I will focus on the perdurantist’s commitments if they choose 
eliminativism or universalism.  
 
The eliminativist perdurantist has the sparsest ontology of all. Like any other true 
eliminativist, they only have one thing in their ontology: simples. Every “object” is 
only a collection of simples arranged in a particular way. It follows, then, that every 
temporal part of every object is simply a collection of simples arranged a certain way at 
a certain instant. A fairly straightforward view, as long as one has made a strong 
commitment to nominalism.  
 
Since we don’t have objects, the only thing that “carves up” simples into objects are the 
ways we name them. We see many simples arranged in a certain spatial manner, and we 
name it a certain thing. I am not, for example, sitting on a chair. I’m sitting on simples 
that are spatially arranged in a certain way that I call “chair.” Positing temporal parts is 
just another way of dividing up simples, dividing them up in time rather than space. 
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The simples that are arranged chair wise at any instant are a temporal part of a “chair.” 
A commitment to nominalism makes this view tenable. 
 
Of the two we discussed, Quine’s view is closer to this view. He accepts that there are 
no objects per se, only what we call objects. In his example the river only exists in 
momentary stages, but he does not accept a necessary connection between these stages. 
He is a nominalist about objecthood. There is no ghostly force or special relation that 
binds temporal parts together into objects, objects are distinct because we name them 
distinctly.  In Quinese, when we point to a river and say “this particular river” we mean 
“the riverish summation of momentary objects which contains this momentary object.”7
 
  
What about those perdurantists who hold unrestricted composition? Theodore Sider is 
one; in his view since every class has a fusion, any two simples make an object, and 
any two simples at an instant make a temporal part. The universalist has too many 
objects, but the universalist perdurantist has it worse, too many objects and too many 
temporal parts composing objects!  
 
In addition to holding unrestricted composition, Sider is an adamant realist8
  
. But what 
is a realist to do with all of these objects? Sider is committed to saying that any class of 
simples at any instant is a temporal part, and any class of temporal parts is an object. It 
is hard to imagine a bigger ontology! Now, not only is my right shoe and your left 
index finger an object,  each combination of a temporal part of my right shoe and a 
temporal part of your left index finger is a distinct object. We now have more objects 
than we know what to do with. 
The only way for Sider to make such a large amount of objects intelligible is to concede 
that there are in fact a very large number of objects, many more than our everyday 
intuitions would tell us. But, that we have so many objects is not a problem because we 
only need to talk about the ones that matter to us. And which objects matter to us? The 
ones we name. Perhaps Sider himself wouldn’t admit it, but he has just accepted a kind 
of nominalism about objects. His realism is at best only a quasi-realism. It is a realism 
that is theoretically true, but not practically true. Even Sider, who considers himself an 
ardent realist, still has to accept a kind of quasi-nominalism for his ontology to make 
sense of our everyday experience.  
 
Let us consider both Quine and Sider’s versions of perdurantism in light of our 
everyday use of objects. Granted, our ordinary conception of objecthood (that 
sometimes two classes create a fusion, while other times they do not) quickly collapses. 
It appears that there can be no principled way to distinguish fusion-creating classes 
from those that do not fuse. Nevertheless, the better theory will better explain our 
everyday experiences of objects.  
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The nominalist is able to give us all and only the objects that are part of our everyday 
experience. What constitutes and object is that we call it an object. Thus, the only 
objects that exist are the one’s which are, by Sider’s view, important.. Realists like 
Sider can also give us all the objects we name, but a plethora of others that non-
philosophers would loathe to call objects. Ask anyone if my cell phone the instant I 
bought it and the white house when occupied by George Washington constitute a 
distinct object and the answer will certainly be no.  As we’ve seen with Sider, even the 
perdurantist realist must employ a kind of practical nominalism to make sense of their 
ontology; this is because for the perdurantist, nominalism better describes our everyday 
experience with objects.  
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